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ABSTRACT: In this essay, I argue that laughter stands as the tricky possibility of the question of 
the meaning of Being, which ridiculously limits and gets limited by tradition beyond limitation. 
I introduce a hermeneutics of laughter and contend that the event of Ereignis receives its 
meaning from Gelotopoesis—the poetic act of laughter. Moreover, I claim that the echo of 
Gelotopoesis becomes the possibility of the transmission of tradition and is attested by a 
hypertonic boastfulness and a hypotonic irony. These two echoing tonalities question an 
unquestionable presence, which tradition never questions, in the most excessive manner so 
that it becomes the proper question of tradition once again. 
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INTRODUCTION: THE QUESTION OF LAUGHTER 
Philosophers have often been thought as thinkers bereft of laughter and cheerfulness. 
The idea that a lot of people, including a good numbers of philosophers, have is that 
philosophers represent an ascetic class of people who advance a serious discipline of 
the most difficult and profound issues. One might assume that Martin Heidegger is 
such a grave figure. Hans-Georg Gadamer, Heidegger’s closest and most trusted 
student, testifies the following: 
Heidegger was a person beset by great questions and final things, a person who 
was shaken down to the last fibers of his existence, who was concerned with God 
and death, with Being and ‘nothing,’ and who had been called to thinking as the 
mission of his life. These were the burning questions of an aroused generation 
whose pride in their cultural and educational tradition had been shaken, the 
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questions that plagued a generation crippled by the horrors of the materialistic 
slaughter of World War I, and these questions were also Heidegger’s questions.1 
Gadamer’s remark seems to be confirmed by the undoubted observation that 
Heidegger had nothing to say about the effect of laughter in philosophical tradition. 
As a result, there is almost no direct engagement with the question of laughter in 
particular and that of the comic in general among Heidegger’s scholars.2 
In what follows, I beg to differ and point out that the question of laughter 
sanctions the question of the meaning of Being as envisioned and rehearsed by 
Heidegger. By raising the question of laughter, I inverse the question ‘What is the 
meaning of laughter?’ into the question ‘Why is it laughter that brings forth meaning?’ 
Rephrased in a Heideggerian way, I put forth the question, ‘Why is it laughter that 
reveals an understanding of Being as well as the preconceived prejudices of tradition 
that conceal such an understanding?’ However, it is most important to note that I 
embark on the question of laughter comically and ridiculously since I follow 
Heidegger’s text closely in order to find something that is not explicitly stated in the 
text. Indeed, what really matters in this essay in not what Heidegger explicitly says but 
rather what Heidegger could never possibly say. The underlying trick here is that 
what Heidegger could never possibly say is the laughable, which authorizes 
Heidegger’s saying. 
In the essay, I hope to initiate a propaedeutic of a hermeneutics of laughter. I 
introduce the question of laughter as the tricky question that advances both an 
understanding of Being and the assumed prejudices that distort such an 
understanding. I identify laughter in an inextricable connection with trickery since the 
interpretive method at hand is fashioned from the mythological figure of Hermes who 
incurs laughter as he deceives. I argue, hence, in favour of a hermeneutics of laughter 
                                                     
1 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Heidegger’s Ways, trans. John W. Stanley, Albany, State University of New York 
Press, 1994, pp. 18-19. 
2 Bernard Freydberg stands as the one and only notable exception. He identifies a rare instance where 
Heidegger mentions to the word ‘komisch’ and argues that this exceptional reference opens up a new 
vista onto Heideggerian thought. Indeed, in Heidegger’s 1943 summer Freiburg lecture course entitled 
‘Der Anfang des abendländischen Denkens. Heraklit,’ the word ‘komisch’ appears in reference to the 
famous Heraclitean Fragment 123, ‘φύσις κρύπτεσθαι φιλε . See Martin Heidegger, Heraklit, Frankfurt 
am Main, Vittorio Klostermann, 1979, p. 138. Freyberg considers the context of the reference to the 
comic within Heidegger’s overall interpretation of the fragment and examines Heidegger’s idiosyncratic 
translation in terms of his direct interpretation. He then digresses to Plato’s Timaeus and investigates the 
insightful attention the Platonic notion of ‘χώρα’ receives in Heidegger’s Introduction to Metaphysics, and he 
concludes that Heidegger’s Heraclitean comedy consists in the most powerful thought that is neither the 
boldest nor the most effective but, rather, the most modest and useless, a thought that lets the gift of 
‘φύσις κρύπτεσθαι’ to be received with appropriate reticence. See Bernard Freydberg, ‘Heidegger’s 
Heraclitean Comedy’, Research in Phenomenology, vol. 37, 2007, pp. 254–268. 
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that dispenses meaning in the form of poetic composition. The hermeneut is initiated 
in the hermeneutic circle by a poetic act of laughter, called ‘γελωτοποιία’ by the 
Greeks, so I playfully name the poetic echo of Hermes’ laughter as ‘Gelotopoesis.’ I 
then turn to Plato and Aristotle and discover a hypertonic boastfulness and a 
hypotonic irony as the two modalities that set the tone for the meaningful echoing of 
laughter. These two modalities of surplus simultaneously authorize and transgress 
what is really at stake in the essay: the possibility of a pure and simple Self-
understanding of Dasein. Through Dasein’s Self-understanding, the notion of 
presence is fully attested as the one and only prejudice of philosophical tradition that 
exceeds, surpasses, and overcomes itself in such an extreme hypertonic pitch that 
conceals itself most hypotonically. I end the essay by noting that Heidegger’s laughter 
forces us to laugh back at Heidegger, thus relegating him to the philosophical heritage 
to which he essentially belongs. By doing so, we show a genuine concern for his 
thinking, albeit through a discourse of understanding that jestingly converts the site of 
concern into a null site that defeats any expectations of shared presuppositions and 
predictable interpretations. 
TRADITION AND THE HERMENEUTICS OF GELOTOPOESIS 
I. The Deceit of Tradition 
Heidegger’s Being and Time starts with a trick. It quotes a line from Plato’s The Sophist 
in which an Elean stranger admits that what they formerly thought they knew, the 
designation ‘Being,’ has now perplexed them.3 The expression ‘Being,’ which was 
once taken to be certain knowledge, has now turned into something discreditable and 
baffling. However, there is an underlying double ploy of perplexity at play here. The 
fundamental complexity is not only the fact that Being itself has now become a 
perplexity and a deception. It is also the fact that the initiation into the interrogation 
of the question of Being is itself a deception and a trick. In a strange way, Being and 
Time begins with a double deception in which the original possibility of the question of 
the expression ‘Being’ is a trick that cunningly conceals another trick. 
Indeed, in the second page of Being of Time, Heidegger declares that the question 
of the meaning of Being ‘has today been forgotten’ (SZ 2). This assertion, I claim, sets 
the interrogative limit of the work itself as a prank. Indeed, on the basis of an initial 
contribution to the question of Being by the early Greek philosophers such as Plato 
                                                     
3 Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, 11th ed., Tübingen, Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1967, p. 1. Hereafter cited 
as SZ, followed by page number. For the reference in The Sophist, see Plato, The Sophist, in trans. Harold 
North Fowler, Theaetetus, The Sophist, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1987, 244a5-8. 
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and Aristotle, Heidegger argues, a ‘dogma’ has been developed that sanctions the 
forgetfulness of the question and conceals its proper remembrance. The limit of the 
philosophical task at hand—that is to say, the encircling horizon that collects all the 
different elements that compose the specific task at hand and decides its unifying 
direction and orientation—is presented as a philosophical dogma, an obtrusive site of 
neglect, forgetfulness, and deception. To philosophically interrogate Being means, 
then, that we penetrate this deceitful site and give an account, as Heidegger states, ‘of 
the presuppositions and prejudices [Vorurteile], which are constantly re-implanting 
and fostering the belief that an inquiry into Being is unnecessary’ (SZ 2). The tradition 
of blind dogmatism constitutes the limit of philosophical questioning and hinders the 
interrogative effectiveness of the question of Being as something completely 
superfluous and unnecessary. 
Nevertheless, it is the same tradition of blind dogmatism that reawakens the 
question of Being and reignites its remembrance. In an essay entitled ‘Hegel and the 
Greeks,’ written in 1958, almost thirty years after Being and Time, Heidegger argues 
that a close examination of the tradition reveals that which tradition cannot think. But 
that which tradition cannot think is, tricky enough, that which cannot be thought by 
anyone: the Unthought or the Unthinkable. He writes: 
It is simply a matter of listening to this tradition in return, and thereby 
examining the prejudices and pre-judgments [Vor-Urteile] in which every 
thinking, in its own way, must dwell. Of course, such examination, too, can 
never conduct itself as the court of justice that ultimately decides upon the 
essence of history and our possible relation to it. For this examination has its 
limit [Grenze], which can be circumscribed as follows: the more thoughtful a 
thinking is, that is, the more is claimed by language, the more authoritative what 
is Unthought [Ungedachte] becomes for it, and even what is Unthinkable 
[Undenkbare] for it.4 
The prank played here is the following: (a) the prejudices of the philosophical 
tradition—firstly inscribed by the Greeks and then reaffirmed by every other 
philosopher, including Hegel—speak to us and say that every case of dogmatic 
thinking is openly disposed to an examination which itself has a limit; nonetheless, (b) 
the limiting case of all traditional presuppositions is that which no language and no 
thought can account for, the Unthought or the Unthinkable, which is, funnily, the 
matter proper to philosophy. 
                                                     
4 Martin Heidegger, ‘Hegel und die Griechen’ in Wegmarken, Frankfurt am Main, Vittorio 
Klostermann, 1976, p. 440. 
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In a bizarre and cunning way, then, Heidegger promotes a phenomenological 
project that turns inwards and towards the deepest and most central assumptions of 
tradition in order to interrogate something that is entirely outwards and outside the 
tradition. Philosophical tradition, as the tradition that makes proper questioning 
possible, is engaged in a duplicitous play of deception by which the possibilities of 
questioning are simultaneously distorted and disposed, concealed and revealed, 
forgotten and remembered, albeit outside and beyond any limiting horizon of 
disposition, revelation, and remembrance. In other words, tradition makes possible, 
predetermines, and delimits questioning, but, by doing so, it simultaneously orients 
and delineates questioning outside and beyond any orientation and delineation. The 
limit of philosophical question is the possibility of philosophical questioning itself, and 
it advances a double trick, a prank par excellence, since it at once limits and gets 
limited beyond any range of limitation. 
In Being and Time, this tricky movement of phenomenological examination is 
described as ‘ontico-ontological’ (SZ 13). It is ontical because it examines regions of 
beings by blindly leaving unquestioned their presuppositions, thus concealing and 
distorting the problematic of their foundation. It is ontological because it penetrates 
the Being of all regions of beings by asserting it as that which is outside and beyond 
any prejudices and presuppositions, thus remembering and revealing it as the 
Unthought and Unthinkable. Heidegger describes the limiting and limited movement 
of the question of the meaning of Being as ‘a relatedness backward or forward [Rück- 
oder Vorbezogenheit]’ (SZ 8). The question of the meaning of Being moves from the 
limited ontical way of questioning back to the limiting ontological one since it is by 
and through an orientation towards Being that all beings receive their meaning. But, 
at the same time, the question of Being moves from the limiting ontological 
questioning forward towards the limited ontical one because it is only by and through 
the ontical regions which cannot think that Being receives its proper meaning as the 
Unthought and Unthinkable. 
The only entity that moves in this tricky fashion is Dasein since ‘Dasein is 
ontically distinctive in that it is ontological’ (SZ 12). However, it is deceiving to name 
Dasein an ‘entity’ since its essential characteristic is the ‘understanding of Being 
[Seinsverständnis]’ (SZ 12). It is also deceiving to state that Dasein has ‘essentials 
characteristics’ since its only characteristic is an existential ontico-ontological double 
movement: (a) a way through which limiting Being makes possible limited beings and 
(b) a way through which limited beings make possible limiting Being. Indeed, 
Heidegger argues that Dasein’s essence is not a ‘what’ that pertains to a subject 
matter; rather, it is ‘existence [Existenz],’ which is defined as ‘that kind of Being towards 
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which Dasein can comport [verhalten] itself in one way or another, and always 
comports itself somehow’ (SZ 12). The kind of Being of Dasein’s comportment is the 
way in which a deceiving limiting/limited Dasein pendulates between Being and 
beings. In a later work entitled Contributions to Philosophy (from Ereignis), Heidegger 
specifically states that ‘Da-sein [is] the Between [das Zwischen] between Beyng and 
beings.’5 But as I wish to stress here, this pendular in-between comportment is a prank 
that situates the funny play of the question of the meaning of Being. It is exactly this 
funny play that reveals Dasein’s way of Being as the way of the question of the 
meaning of Being. It is, at the same time, the funny play of hermeneutic interpretation 
that gives a meaningful understanding of beings as such, as they are in their Being. 
Indeed, Heidegger states that ‘the meaning of phenomenological description lies in 
interpretation [Auslegung]’ and that ‘the phenomenology of Dasein has the character of a 
ἑρμηνεύειν, through which the authentic meaning of Being, and also those basic 
structures of Being which Dasein itself possesses, are made known [kundgegeben] to 
Dasein’s understanding of Being’ (SZ 37). Hence, the deceitful movement of 
phenomenological questioning is ‘ontico-ontological’ insofar as it is hermeneutical. 
II. The Laughter of Hermes 
In the epics and myths of the Greeks, the figure of Hermes is inextricably connected 
with deception, trickery, and laughter. In Odyssey, Hermes tells Apollo—amidst the 
gods’ general amusement at the sight of adulterous Ares and Aphrodite entrapped by 
the betrayed Hephaestus—that it is worth paying the heavy price of public 
humiliation if he gets the chance to sleep by the side of the goddess of love. His 
remark ‘aroused laughter [γέλως] among the immortal gods.’6 In Homeric Hymns, 
Hermes is described as a ‘child of many shifts, blandly cunning, a robber, a cattle 
driver, a bringer of dreams, a watcher by night, a thief at the gates.’ He turns a 
tortoise into a singer, which made Apollo ‘laugh [ἐγέλασσε]’ in delight.7 In addition, 
Hermes steals away Apollo’s cattle but ‘Zeus laughed out loud [μέγ ӭ ἐξεγέλασσεν] to 
see his evil-plotting child well and cunningly denying guilt about the cattle.’8 Theft, 
mendacity, and trickery are ways of the messenger of the gods, and they elicit laughter 
and pleasure among gods and humans alike. 
                                                     
5 Martin Heidegger, Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis), Frankfurt am Main, Vittorio Klostermann, 1989, 
p. 343. 
6 Homer, Odyssey, Books 1-12, trans. A. T. Murray, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2002, VIII, 343. 
7 Homeric Hymns, in trans. Hugh G. Evelyn White, Hesiod, Homeric Hymns, Epic Cycle, Homerica, Cambridge, 
Harvard University Press, 2002, IV, 13-29. 
8 Homeric Hymns, IV, 389-90. 
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In another instance in Homeric Hymns, Hermes constructs a lyre and attempts to 
entice from the instrument a suitable accompaniment for his beautiful singing: ‘At the 
touch of his hand, it sounded marvellously; and, as he tried it, the god sang sweet 
random snatches, just as youths swap matching insults with one another at festivals.’9 
Beautiful singing and the trading of insults are juxtaposed here. Each insult is uttered 
in the form of song and invites a response. Young men convert insults by means of 
musical activity, thus engaged in a dialogue composed by comico-lyrical rules of 
contact. Lyrical insults constitute a principle of exchange which reflects the wider 
practices of mutuality and reciprocity among attendees of festival and symposia.10 In 
ancient Greece, this comico-lyrical poetic exchange is associated with revellers. In 
Homeric Hymns, Hermes associates his lyre ‘to the rich feast and lovely dance and 
glorious revel.’11 It is important to note Aristotle’s observation that term comedy 
[κωμῳδία] was probably proposed by the Dorians in the fourth century. Aristotle 
remarks that Dorians content that ‘comic performers [κωμῳδοί] got their names not 
from revelling [κωμάζειν] but from wandering through villages [κώμας] when 
banned from the city.’12 In any case, the early comedians were engaged in a lyrical 
dialogue and were custodians of the messenger god Hermes. 
In a work written in the early 1950s entitled On the Way to Language, Heidegger 
composes a dialogue between a Japanese person and an inquirer and stresses the 
importance of hermeneutics in his quest for the question of Being. He writes: 
Japanese: Why do you stress the original sense of ἑρμηνεύειν? 
Inquirer: Because it was this original sense which prompted me to use it in 
defining the phenomenological thinking that opened the way to Being and Time 
for me. What mattered then, and still does, is to bring out the Being of beings—
though no longer in the manner of metaphysics, but such that Being itself will 
shine out, Being itself—that is to say: the presence of present beings, the twofold 
of the two in virtue of their simple oneness. This is what makes its claim on man, 
calling him to its essential being.13 
                                                     
9 Homeric Hymns, IV, 53-56. 
10 Stephen Halliwell notes that much of the archaic Greek poetry was not only designed for performance 
at actual drinking-parties but was also preoccupied with the dramatisation of imaginary symposia, a 
literary practice subsequently adapted by many prose writers from the classical to imperial periods. 
Stephen Halliwell, Greek Laughter: A Study of Cultural Psychology from Homer to Early Christianity, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2008, pp. 100-154. 
11 Homeric Hymns, IV, 480-481. 
12 Aristotle, Poetics, in trans. Stephen Halliwell, Poetics, Longinus, On the Sublime, Demetrius, On Style, 
Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1995, 1448a29-b1. 
13 Martin Heidegger, Unterwegs zur Sprache, 14th ed., Stuttgart, Klett-Cotta, 2007, p. 122. 
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The question of human essence is examined by and through the greater question of 
the meaning of Being. What matters diachronically in Heidegger’s phenomenological 
thinking before, during, and after Being and Time is an engagement with 
hermeneutics that renders possible the twofold of Being and beings in its simple 
presence. This difference between Being and beings is traced back to the divine 
sojourn of the messenger god Hermes. Heidegger notes: 
The expression ‘hermeneutic’ derives from the Greek verb ἑρμηνεύειν. That 
verb is related to the noun ἑρμηνεύς, which is referable to the name of the god 
Ἑρμῆς by a playful thinking that is more compelling than the rigor of science. 
Hermes is the divine messenger. He brings the message [die Botschaft] of 
destiny; ἑρμηνεύειν is that exposition which brings news [Kunde] because it 
can listen to a message. Such an exposition becomes an interpretation of what 
has been said earlier by the poets who, according to Socrates in Plato’s Ion 
(534e), ἑρμηνῆς εἰσὶ τῶν θεῶν—’are interpreters [Botschafter] of the Gods.’14 
In this passage, Heidegger refers directly to the Platonic dialogue called Ion, in which 
Socrates and Ion argue whether the art of rhapsody is a matter of personal 
performance on account of the artist’s skill. Socrates maintains that the daughter of 
Mnemosyne, the Muse, ‘inspires people herself, and then, by means of these inspired 
persons, the inspiration spreads to others and holds them in a connected chain.’15 For 
Plato, it is not by individual craft that the rhapsodes ‘compose and say all fine things 
about the matters of Gods and humans’ but by a ‘divine dispensation [θείᾳ μοίρᾳ],’ 
which enables ‘each to compose only that to which the Muse has thrown to him.’16 
The art of rhapsody, like any other poetic composition, is endowed to the poet by 
divine dispensation. The poet is initiated in the hermeneutic circle by a movement 
that maintains and shelters the poetic word as it is allotted by the goddess of Memory 
and her daughters. 
Indeed, Heidegger, like Plato, sees the poetic vocation as a matter not only of 
hermeneutic initiation and circulation but also of memorial recitation and 
dispensation. Heidegger notes in the early 1950s in a lecture entitled What is Called 
Thinking?: 
Memory [Gedächtnis], mother of muses—the recollection [Andenken] to what 
is to be thought [zu-Denkende] is the source and ground [Quellgrund] of 
poetry. This is why poetry is the water that, at times, flows backwards towards 
                                                     
14 Heidegger, Unterwegs zur Sprache, pp. 121-122. 
15 Plato, Ion, in trans. Harold North Fowler and W. R. M. Lamb, The Statesman, Philebus, Ion, Cambridge, 
Harvard University Press, 2001, 533e57. 
16 Plato, Ion, 534b9-c3. 
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the source, towards thinking as recollection [Andenken]. Poetry wells up only 
from recollective meditation recollecting [aus der An-dacht des Andenkens].17 
In this passage, Heidegger refers to the tradition of Greek mythological poetry and 
asserts two important points. Firstly, it is the flow of dispensing memory that reveals 
the source of thinking. Remembrance gathers together present beings as such, as they 
are in their source or their Being. Secondly, analogous to the tricky existential ontico-
ontological movement of Dasein, remembrance aims the most backward, Being, in 
order to bring forth the most forward, i.e., beings as such in their unity, in their Being. 
The movement of remembrance runs the distance between the most backward and 
the most forward and recalls Being ‘in’ beings and beings ‘in’ Being—that is to say, 
their ‘in-between’ unique difference, the simple oneness of the twofold that stands in 
their middle. 
But again, the dispensing voice of memory is resounded through laughter, 
trickery, and distortion. In Theogony, Hesiod names Thaleia [Θάλεια], sometimes 
spelled as Thalia [Θαλία], as one of the nine muses and daughters of Mnemosyne.18 
He also reports that Zeus’ palace ‘laughs [γελᾷ]’—that is to say, resounds joyfully—
‘with the lily-like voices of the singing muses.’19 Indeed, Thaleia is described as a 
delicate and educated muse who is drawn to leisure and country festivals. She is also 
associated with comedies and comic theatre masks.20 Likewise, Cicero records that 
Mnemosyne is the mother of the following four muses: Aoide [Ἀοιδή], Melete 
[Μελέτη], Arche [Ἀρχή], and Thelxinoe [Θελξινόη].21 Even though Thaleia is not 
mentioned in Cicero, the last daughter of mythical memory, Thelxinoe, is the muse of 
seduction and distortion. The word for the Goddess of seduction, ‘Θελξινόη,’ comes 
from the verb ‘θέλγω,’ which is synonymous to the Latin ‘fallo’ and means to distort, 
to seduce, and to cheat. The noun ‘θέλγητρον’ is a soother, sedative agent, philtre, 
potion, or drug [μέσον καταπραΰνον, φάρμακον]. It is usually translated both as a 
remedy and poison.22 Marcel Detienne observes that in the Greek Pantheon, Peitho 
[Πειθώ], the goddess of persuasion, wears the masks of Thelxinoe and becomes one 
                                                     
17 Martin Heidegger, Was Heißt Denken?, 5th ed., Tübingen, Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1997, p. 7. 
18 Hesiod, Theogony, in trans. Hugh G. Evelyn White, Hesiod, Homeric Hymns, Epic Cycle, Homerica, 
Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2002, 77. 
19 Hesiod, Theogony, 40. 
20 See Brill’s New Pauly Encyclopaedia of the Ancient World, Volume 14, Hubert Cancik and Helmuth Schneider 
(eds.), Leiden, Brill, 2009, pp. 362-363. 
21 See Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods, in trans. H. Rackham, On the Nature of the Gods, Academics, 
Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1993, III, 54. 
22 Henry George Liddell and Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, Oxford, Clarendon 
Press, 1996, p.788. See also Π. Χ. Δορμπαράκη, Επίτομον Λεξικόν Της Αρχαίας Ελληνικής 
Γλώσσης, Αθήνα, Κολλάρου & Σία, 1992, p. 378. 
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of the muses. She stands for the power of speech over others, and she mythically 
represents the charm of the voice, the seduction of speech, and the magic of words. 
She is distinguished by the verb ‘thelgein [θέλγειν]’ and ‘terpein [τέρπειν]’ and the 
nouns ‘thelkterion [θελκτήριον],’ ‘philtron [φίλτρον],’ and ‘pharmakon 
[φάρμακον].’ She is fundamentally ambiguous, both beneficent and harmful.23 Like 
Hermes and the lyrical muses, she ambivalently dispenses the poetic word through 
seduction and trickery. 
III. The Event of Gelotopoesis 
As it is apparent both in Greek mythology and Heidegger, the art of poetic vocation 
does not simply refer to the lyrical recitation of poems. Rather, it is the divine 
dispensation that initiates the poet into the art of remembrance and the movement of 
the hermeneutic circle. In On the Way to Language, Heidegger names the poetic 
vocation as a ‘site,’ an extremity in which everything comes together. He explains: 
The site [Ort] gathers unto itself, supremely and in the extreme. Its gathering 
power penetrates and pervades everything. The site, the gathering power, 
gathers in and preserves all it has gathered, not like an encapsulating shell but 
rather by penetrating with its light all it has gathered, and only thus releasing it 
into its own nature.24 
The poetic site is the realm, horizon, or encircling limit where everything is gathered 
together in accordance to its supreme extremity. Poetry stands as the empowering 
limit that collects all beings and lights them up in line with their lighting source. 
Hence, as Heidegger states, ‘the individual poems derive their light and sound from 
the poetic site’.25 It is within the gathering limit of poetry that phenomena are 
recollected, revealed and, thus, endowed with colour and melody. 
Similarly, the poet, the proper artisan and hermeneut of poetic recollection, 
enunciates the lustre and accent of things as they appear and resonate from their 
original source. However, equally significant, Heidegger describes the poetic source 
the poet calls forth as an appearance of concealment and deception. He remarks in a 
lecture delivered in 1951 entitled ‘. . . Poetically Man Dwells . . .’: 
But the poet calls all the brightness of the spectacles [Anblicke] of the sky and 
every sound of its courses and breezes into the singing word and there makes 
them shine and ring. Yet, the poet, if he is a poet, does not describe the mere 
                                                     
23 Marcel Detienne, The Masters of Truth in Archaic Greece, trans. Janet Lloyd, New York, Zone Books, 1999, 
p. 77. 
24 Heidegger, Unterwegs zur Sprache, p. 37. 
25 Heidegger, Unterwegs zur Sprache, p 38. 
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appearance of sky and earth. The poet calls, in the spectacles of the sky, that 
which in its very self-disclosure [Sichenthüllen] causes the appearance of that 
which conceals itself, and indeed as that which conceals itself [Sichverbergende]. 
In the familiar appearances, the poet calls the alien [Fremde] as that to which 
the invisible [Unsichtbare] imparts itself in order to remain what it is: unknown 
[unbekannt].26 
The poet does not announce the ‘mere’ appearance of beings but the appearance of 
beings as it ‘is’—that is to say, as an appearance that springs from a self-disclosing 
source. But the appearance of beings on earth and sky ‘is’ what it ‘seems’ since beings 
are tricky appearances of an appearing source that does not appear. A familiar play of 
trickery is announced here: appearances are announced as such but there is nothing 
to appear since that which allows appearing does not give itself to appearance. The 
joke announced is that only the poet calls for the appearance as it ‘is’; nonetheless, this 
appearance ‘is’ the ‘unknown,’ a tricky possibility that renders the appearance 
impossible. In a way, then, the appearance of beings is nothing other than the self-
concealing and self-deceiving hermeneutic power of the poet, transmitted 
unknowingly by the ways of laughter. 
I would propose at this point that what Heidegger calls ‘das Ereignis’—usually 
translated as ‘appropriating event’ or ‘appropriation’ in English—could be just 
another name for the echoing laughter of Hermes. Heidegger notes in Contributions to 
Philosophy (from Ereignis): 
The echo [Anklang] of Beyng as refusal in the abandonment of beings by 
Being—this already says that here something present-at-hand is not to be 
described or explained—or to be arranged. The burden of thinking in the other 
beginning of philosophy is different: it is en-thinking that which is appropriated 
as the appropriating event itself [das Er-denken dessen, was sich ereignet als das 
Ereignis selbst].27 
The echo of Being refuses to abandon beings, so it revoices and recollects them as 
they are in their Being. The burden of this echoing restoration is uniquely different: a 
difference that is deceptively different insofar as it refuses to either differentiate beings 
or get differentiated by beings. Indeed, Heidegger has already claimed in another 
work that ‘Being is no being, no thing and no thingly property, nothing present-at-hand 
[Das Sein ist kein Seiendes, kein Ding und keine dingliche Eigenschaft, nichts 
                                                     
26 Martin Heidegger, ‘. . . dichterisch wohnet der Mensch . . .’, in Vorträge und Aufsätze, 10th ed., Stuttgart, 
Klett-Cotta, 2004, p. 194. 
27 Heidegger, Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis), p. 108. 
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Vorhandenes].’28 Ereignis, then, as the laughing event of Being, does not get 
recognized and differentiated among beings. It is a resounding echo, a ‘ha ha ha’ 
sound that makes thinking possible as proper thinking, albeit through a bouncing 
sound that itself returns a sound which is so ridiculously different that doesn’t make a 
difference. The event of the echo of Being is a proper event of laughter, a resounding 
that is so spasmodic and inarticulate that resists regulation and articulation in the 
trickiest and silliest way. 
It is perhaps important to note here the English verb ‘to laugh’ and the German 
verbs ‘lachen’ and ‘klagen,’ as well as the nouns ‘die Klage,’ ‘der Klang,’ and ‘der 
Anklang,’ come from the Greek ‘κλώσσειν,’ which denotes an irregular, spasmodic, 
and epanaleptic clucking, rattling, or turning of the tongue [κλαγγή, κροτάλισμα 
τῆς γλώσσης].29 It is immediately related to the verb ‘κλώθω,’ which means to knit 
or twist by spinning. Clotho [Κλωθώ] is a daughter of Mnemosyne and one of the 
three Moirai, and she is the one who spins the thread of life.30 Again, the poetic event 
of the divine dispensation that gives meaning, sound, and colour to all things on earth 
and sky comes to be a dispensation of laughter. A closer examination of the hidden 
ontological and etymological associations of the event of laughter reveals that the 
question of Being receives its meaning from what the Greeks call ‘γελωτοποιία,’ the 
‘poesis of laughter,’ which I playfully call Gelotopoesis.31 Thus, one can talk about the 
event of Gelotopoesis as an echoing event that transmits spasmodic and epanaleptic 
                                                     
28 Martin Heideggger, Die Grundbegriffe der Mataphysik: Welt—Endlichkeit—Einsamkeit, Frankfurt am Main, 
Vittorio Klostermann, 1983, p. 470. 
29 Eric Partridge, Origins: An Etymological Dictionary of Modern English, London, Routledge, 1991, p. 340. 
Joseph Shipley similarly reports that ‘laugh’ and ‘laughter’ are derivates of the Indo-European root ‘kleg.’ 
See Joseph T. Shipley, The Origin of English Words: A Discursive Dictionary of Indo-European Roots, Baltimore, 
The John Hopkins University Press, 1984, p. 186. It is also reported that the Greek verb ‘γελ ω,’ the 
German ‘lachen,’ and the English ‘to laugh’ share the same Indo-European root ‘gelh,’ which has an 
etymological connection with the verb ‘to shine’ and the notions of brightness and light. It is also 
important to note that the Greek word ‘γλήνη,’ which designates the pupil of the eye, stems from the 
same root. See Robert S. P. Beekes, Etymological Dictionary of Greek, Volume One, Leiden, Brill, 2010, pp. 264-
265. The etymological connection between laughter, light, and the eye is important since Heidegger 
insists that one can retrieve the word ‘das Auge,’ which means ‘eye,’ from the notion of Ereignis. He 
writes: ‘Appropriation, in Be-eye-ing human nature, makes mortals appropriate for that which avows 
itself from everywhere to man in Saying, which points toward the concealed [Das Ereignis ereignet in 
seinem Er-äugen des Menschenwesens die Sterblichen dadurch, daß es sie dem vereignet, was sich dem 
Menschen in der Sage von überall her auf Verborgenes hin zu-sagt].’ See Heidegger, Unterwegs zur 
Sprache, p. 260. 
30 See Liddell and Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, p. 963. 
31 The Greek word ‘γέλοιος,’ sometimes spelled as ‘γελο ος,’ is rich in its multivocality and designates 
the laughable, comic, amusing, jesting, mirth-provoking, facetious, ludicrous, absurd, and paradoxical. 
See Liddell and Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, p. 342. 
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rattlings, which, as it turns out to be, remain that which tradition could only transmit. 
In the next section, we will examine some of the complex hermeneutic structures of 
Being in Being and Time and indicate the echo of Gelotopoesis as the way in which the 
possibility of the transmission of tradition becomes a laughing matter of a puzzling, 
deceiving, and tricky tonality. 
THE ECHO OF GELOTOPOESIS: ON BOASTFULNESS AND IRONY 
I. A Greek Laughing Tone 
To capture the pitch of the laughing echo, I suggest we briefly turn to the thought of 
Plato and Aristotle. In Philebus, Plato defines the ‘laughable [γελοῖον]’ as ‘the opposite 
of the condition mentioned in the inscription ‘Know oneself [γνῶθι σαυτόν]’ at 
Delphi,’ which apparently says ‘not to know oneself at all [μηδαμῇ γιγνώσκειν 
αὑτὸν].’32 Socrates illustrates this lack of Self-knowledge with the character of a man 
who supposes to be more affluent, more beautiful, or more virtuous than he actually 
is. The laughable, then, is a kind of a Self-understanding that assumes conditions of 
Self-knowledge, although in an arrogant way that discloses signs of Self-ignorance. 
The laughable man interprets himself as something that he is, but his interpretation is 
just an exercise of selfish overindulgence that reveals that which the laughable man is 
not. Plato’s fool assumes he possesses Self-knowledge, but the assumption of Self-
knowledge is only an indication of a deceitful pomposity that undermines and 
overturns the assumption itself. 
Undoubtedly, one can find parallels of Plato’s laughable man with Aristotle’s 
character of a ‘boaster [ἀλαζών]’ who, in his pretension to promote himself more 
than he deserves, ‘he appears to be more foolish [μάταιος] than vicious.’ Yet, 
Aristotle opposes the figure of the boaster with that of the ‘ironist [εἴρων]’ who 
pretends to be less than he is. An ironic man sometimes depreciates himself for the 
pure dislike of ostentation and self-promotion, as Socrates used to do, and this kind of 
irony is held in high esteem. But at other times, an ironic man depreciates himself in 
the most ostentatious manner, and such mock humility becomes ridiculous. Aristotle 
gives the example of the Spartan dress, which, in its ‘excessiveness [ὑπερβολὴ]’ and 
‘extreme deficiency [λίαν ἔλλειψις],’ exhibits a touch of ostentation.33 The point 
here is that both the boaster and the ironist induce laughter in an exactly opposite 
                                                     
32 Plato, Philebus, in trans. Harold North Fowler and W. R. M. Lamb, The Statesman, Philebus, Ion, 
Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2001, 48c5-d3. 
33 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. H. Rackham, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1999, 1127b9-
29. 
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way: the boaster invites laughter by a way of excess and the ironist by a way of 
deficiency. But again, there is a double ploy at play here. The boaster says ‘too much’ 
and the ironist ‘too little,’ but what they truly say is that which they share in their 
saying, which is the word ‘too,’ an expression of surplus. In other words, the laughable 
is an expression of a duplicitous surplus—both a ‘too much’ and a ‘too little.’ Not 
surprisingly, then, Aristotle describes the ‘buffoons [βωμολόχοι]’ as people who 
exhibit ‘excess or deficiency of the mean [ὑπερβολὴ τε καί ἔλλειψις τοῦ μέσου].’34 
Therefore, buffoonery, as I wish to claim, is the hidden trick itself since it is 
exactly the modality of surplus that simultaneously authorizes and transgresses the 
mean or limit of the inscription at Delphi and the conditions for absolute Self-
knowledge and Self-ignorance. On the one hand, buffoonery authorizes the search for 
Self-understanding since it pompously assumes, enables, facilitates, and makes 
possible its conditions. Indeed, the loud declaration ‘I know myself’ invites the 
responding question ‘What does it mean for one to know oneself?’ so that an enquiry 
on the possibility of Self-knowledge presents itself and becomes worthwhile. On the 
other hand, the mere magnitude of the declaration ridicules and belittles the 
conditions of the declaration itself in such a way that the statement ‘I know myself’ is 
so insignificant, irrelevant, and unreliable that does not merit the response ‘What does 
it mean for one to know oneself?’ In an ironic way, the loud declaration ‘I know 
myself’ is so excessively loud that it numbs all ears and transgresses any possible 
response; it falls on deaf ears as if itself has no strength and no potency. It resounds 
and echoes around silently since it so extremely demeaned and debased that says 
nothing and is heard by no one. 
This duplicitous comportment of laughter, as I will argue in what follows, does 
not lie outside the question of the meaning of Being; on the contrary, it is its radical 
possibility as that which simultaneously authorizes and transgresses its discursive 
unfolding. Boastfulness and irony are the two modalities that set the tone for the 
meaningful echoing ‘ha ha ha’ of Dasein. 
II. Hypertonic Boastfulness 
In the first section of Being and Time, Heidegger boasts he has singularly identified the 
following three presuppositions that undermine the entire tradition of thinking: (a) 
Being is the ‘most universal [allgemeinste]’ concept, (b) Being is an ‘indefinable 
[undefinierbar]’ concept, and (c) Being is a ‘self-evident [selbstverständliche]’ concept. 
These three assumptions hamper the path of the question of the meaning of Being—
                                                     
34 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1128a3-4. 
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the only question that merits interrogation since it is the only the question that 
penetrates the essence of all beings. By considering them, Heidegger claims, one could 
make plain ‘not only that the question of Being lacks an answer but that the question 
itself is obscure and without a direction’ (SZ, 3-4). Nonetheless, in the sixth section of 
the work, Heidegger makes the even more audacious claim that the task of 
interpreting the basis of ancient ontology demonstrates that ‘beings are grasped in 
their Being as “presence [Anwesenheit]”; this means that they are understood with 
regard to a definite mode of time—the “present [Gegenwart]”’ (SZ 25). The notion of 
presence is highlighted here as the one and only interpretative limit of philosophical 
thinking that hinders the possibility of obtaining a meaningful view of beings in their 
unity. One can recognize here a movement of a double self-overindulgence and 
pomposity in which the ridiculous statement ‘all thinking is limited by three 
presuppositions’ is surpassed by the even more ridiculous statement, ‘all thinking is 
limited by one and only presupposition.’ 
In an essay entitled ‘The Anaximander Fragment,’ Heidegger traces the one and 
only presupposition of thinking back to epic poetry of Homer and notes the following: 
Thus τὰ ἐόντα designates beings in the sense of the present [Gegenwärtigen]. 
When we moderns speak of the ‘present [gegenwärtig],’ we either mean what is 
‘now’—which we represent as something within time, the ‘now [Jetzt]’ serving 
as a phase in the stream of time—or we bring the ‘present’ into relation with the 
‘objective [Gegenständigen].’35 
Heidegger here interprets the archaic word ‘τὰ ἐόντα’ as it appears in Homer and 
observes that (a) all beings are designated as things that are objectively capable to be 
presented now and at this moment and that (b) Being is thought as the constantly 
objective and present stream of time that situates all temporal beings as presentable 
objects. Being is defined with regards to beings as just another present being, and it is 
presupposed as a present being that grounds and relates all other present beings in 
and through its presence. As a result, Being is considered as the constant, objective, 
and presenting stream of presence, thus becoming another present object, i.e., 
another presentable being. Correspondingly, replicating Homer’s attempt to relate 
beings with Being, all consequent poets and philosophers have reduced Being to an 
objective and present being just like any other being. The entire tradition of thinkers 
has concealed the fact that Being is purely transcendental—outside, beyond, and 
before any particular ontical regions of beings. Indeed, when Heidegger claims that 
‘Being is the transcendens pure and simple [Sein ist das transcendens schlechthin]’ (SZ 38), he 
                                                     
35 Martin Heidegger, ‘Der Spruch des Anaximander’, in Holzwege, Frankfurt am Main, Vittorio 
Klostermann, 1977, p. 346. 
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makes a fool of the Greek and Scholastic philosophical traditions, which, in their 
effort to define Being as transcendence, have instead concealed and distorted the pure 
and simple transcendental essence of Being. By repeating the above traditional 
doctrine of Being, Heidegger boasts he has exceptionally managed to surpass all 
traditional thinkers by recollecting that which they have persistently forgotten. 
At this point, I wish to claim that the whole of Being and Time promotes and 
parades the above charade of extreme boastfulness. Indeed, Heidegger claims that 
there is one and only entity which determines itself as an entity, thus comprehending 
itself fully and thoroughly as an entity that is undermined and distorted by the notion 
of the present. But this ‘entity’ is not an entity as such but rather an existential Dasein 
who is exceedingly arrogant since it determines itself ‘in light of a possibility which it is 
itself and which, in its very Being, it somehow understands’ (SZ 43). Dasein is the 
most preposterous boaster because it claims Self-understanding only through and 
within itself since it interprets itself as ‘an understanding potentiality-for Being 
[Seinkönnen], which in its Being, makes an issue of that Being itself’ (SZ 231). In other 
words, Dasein claims pure and simple Self-understanding since it predestines, defines, 
and directs its comprehension in accordance to the unique potentiality of its own 
Selfhood. The phenomenological stratagem devised by Heidegger at this point is the 
following: through Dasein’s Self-understanding, the notion of presence is fully 
revealed as the one and only presupposition that exceeds and surpasses itself in such 
an extreme way that utterly conceals itself. Dasein’s orientation towards that which 
exactly describes a clear understanding of tradition is Dasein’s exceeding Self-
orientation and Self-understanding. 
In this sense, Dasein interprets itself as the movement that does not take presence 
for granted, thus allowing a proper problematization of the question of the origin and 
destiny of tradition. Again, in the most overblown manner, Heidegger names Dasein 
as ‘what is primarily historical’ (SZ 381). As the one and only history that ‘is,’ Dasein 
understands what obstructs the origin and destiny of tradition in such a superlative 
way that it absolutely identifies itself with that very movement of the origin and 
destiny of tradition. That is to say, Dasein is so overconfident in its hermeneutic 
deployment that it becomes the unquestionable origin and destiny of tradition. As the 
unquestionable question of the meaning of historical tradition, Dasein disentangles 
the hurdles of the notion of presence and brings tradition back to a resolution. When 
Dasein ‘brings itself back [Sichzurückholen],’ it ‘becomes authentic Being-one’s-Self 
[Selbstsein]’ (SZ 268). By this act of stepping back, which is a nothing other than the 
aforementioned back-and-forth movement of poetic recollection, Dasein recollects the 
complete and outstanding history of its own Self- understanding, thus becoming the 
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resolute potentiality that clears up the question of the meaning of Being as the 
question of an unquestionable presence. 
As a historical destiny of the most magnified proportion, Dasein’s Selfhood is 
formally defined ‘as a way of existing [eine Weise zu existieren].’ Then, as an immediate 
result, ‘the question of the “who” of Dasein has been answered with the expression 
“Self [Selbst]”’ (SZ 267). Again, Heidegger poses Dasein as a moment of paroxysmal 
understanding, an episode of a most increased acuteness by which Dasein identifies 
itself with its Selfhood and becomes the exceptional knowledge that ‘is,’ which is 
nothing other than the pure and simple understanding of its own potentiality. This 
‘authentic potentiality-for-Being-one’s-Self [Selbstseinkönnen]’ is attested by Dasein’s ‘voice of 
conscience [Stimme des Gewissens]’ (SZ 267-268). The horizon of Dasein’s self-
comprehension, its own understanding of what its Selfhood could only be, is 
evidenced by its voice of conscience. Heidegger is quick to dismiss any traditional 
interpretations of this voice and suggests that one should view this phenomenon as 
one that ‘discloses [erschließt]’ and ‘gives us “something” to understand’ (SZ 269). I 
suggest here that we follow Heidegger’s clue and explicate the notion of the voice of 
conscience as ‘the gathering together [σὺν] of knowledge [εἴδησις].’ In Greek, the 
noun ‘das Gewissen’ is exactly expressed by the compound word ‘συνείδησις.’ The 
word ‘εἴδησις’ is a direct derivative of the verb ‘to see [εἴδω],’ and it means idea, 
sight, novelty, evidence, and knowledge.36 
Indeed, what conscience brings forth is the disclosing event of Dasein’s 
unprecedented Self-understanding. Heidegger here interprets Dasein’s modality of 
understanding in terms of a ‘call [Ruf],’ which unfolds itself in ‘a mode of speech [ein 
Modus der Rede]’ (SZ 269). But again, most selfishly, Dasein only talks about its 
supreme exceptionality. Heidegger writes: ‘In the call of conscience, what is it that is 
talked about [das Beredete]—in other words, to what is the appeal [Angerufene] 
made? Manifestly, Dasein itself’ (SZ 272). That which Dasein only talks about is that 
which Dasein asks, and that is the question of its extraordinary Self-understanding. 
But Dasein’s question only appeals to Dasein itself and does not receive a response by 
anyone else. It thus appeals unquestionably in the most uncontested manner. Dasein’s 
call is the most unchallenged reverberation that ‘is.’ It reigns with the highest pitch of 
                                                     
36 See Liddell and Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, p. 482. It is also interesting to note that the German ‘das 
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boastfulness, and it echoes in the most excessive case of hypertonicity. But in the most 
oddly way, this supreme case of hypertonic boastfulness calls into question the limit of 
Dasein’s Self-understanding. This funny game of asking an unanswerable question 
becomes an occasion for Dasein to pay attention to the question itself since it 
questions that which is not supposed to be questioned. Therefore, what is constantly 
questioned in the most hypertonic manner is the event of the question of the 
unquestionable, an event that tradition never questions. 
III. Hypotonic Irony 
In Being and Time, the echo of hypertonic boastfulness is complemented by that of 
hypotonic irony. Indeed, the work is engaged in a fitful air of playfulness by which the 
arrogant possibility of Dasein’s pure and simple Self-comprehension is levelled down 
to pure and simple indifference. For example, Heidegger states that the formal 
meaning of Dasein’s existential constitution ‘should be uncovered in the 
undifferentiated character [indifferenten Zunächst] in which it [Dasein] is initially 
and for the most part’ and that this is ‘not nothing [nicht nichts] but a positive 
phenomenal characteristic of this entity’ (SZ 43). The supremely egotistical ‘entity’ of 
Dasein, which through and within its Selfhood struts towards its Self-knowledge, is 
depreciated in the most ridiculous manner. The pure and simple completion of 
Dasein’s Self-knowledge is described as indifference, thus failing to differentiate that 
which has always been supposed to differentiate: a resolute understanding of the 
unitary, isolated, and exceptional Selfhood of Dasein. In its overconfident 
hermeneutic deployment, Dasein interprets itself as that which could possibly be, 
which is, ironically, that which could never possibly be, an indication of its own Self-
ignorance. 
As Self-ignorant, Dasein cannot give an account of the horizon of its own 
limitation and cannot differentiate presence as the neglected limitation of tradition. 
Dasein admits failure and comes face to face with the notion of presence as the 
unknowable limit that necessitates its exceptional Selfhood. But this admittance of 
defeat is ironic in the most extreme way since Dasein remains so blindly defeated 
towards its necessary limit so that it does not consider it necessary any more. That is 
to say, the admittance of presence is taken for granted so extremely that there is no 
urgent necessity for presence to be taken for granted. Since presence is not taken for 
granted any more, the question of its necessity inevitably becomes an issue again. This 
ironic ploy is exhibited in Being and Time in the way in which the proper consideration 
of the notion of presence does not bring forth a presupposition-less notion of absence 
that is empty of temporality. On the contrary, the authentic recollection of presence 
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affirms presence as a temporal phenomenon. Hence, the question of the meaning of 
Being, as the question of the unquestioned assumption of presence, is interrogated in 
and through the horizontal limit of temporality. In the very first page of the work, 
Heidegger states his intentions and notes that the provisional aim of the whole work is 
‘the interpretation of time [Zeit] as the possible horizon for any understanding 
whatsoever of Being’ (SZ 1). The ontico-ontological ‘ha ha ha’ echo of Dasein that 
gives meaning to beings is fully temporal. 
In addition, the temporal way of Dasein is regarded as care since, as Heidegger 
states, ‘Dasein’s Being reveals itself as care’ (SZ 182). The disclosing call of conscience, 
then, is a solicitous call that meaningfully expresses the way in which Dasein 
depreciates itself, albeit in a concerning way. Heidegger explains: 
The call reaches Dasein in this understanding of itself which it always has, and 
which is concerning in an everyday-average [alltäglich-durchschnittlich] 
manner. The call reaches the they-Self of concerning Being with Others [Das 
Man-selbst des besorgenden Mitseins mit Anderen wird vom Ruf getroffen]. (SZ 
272) 
These short but compact sentences call attention to three important points. Firstly, in 
an everyday-average manner, Dasein brings itself to its own Self-ignorance. 
Elsewhere, Heidegger notes that ‘the everyday undifferentiated character of Dasein’ is 
named as ‘averageness [Durchschnittlichkeit]’ (SZ 43) and that ‘this care of averageness 
reveals in turn an essential tendency of Dasein which we call the levelling down 
[Einebnung] of all possibilities of Dasein’ (SZ 127). Secondly, as Self-ignorant, Dasein 
loses its distinctiveness and becomes the neuter they-Self: an indistinctive and 
anonymous ‘nobody [Niemand]’ to whom Dasein has surrendered itself and from whom 
Dasein does not distinguish itself (SZ 127). Thirdly, Dasein is essentially ‘Being-with 
[Mitsein]’ as Being with the indistinctive Others. As a result, the Others is ‘a duplicate 
[eine Dublette]’ of Dasein’s isolated Selfhood (SZ 124). In other words, Dasein ‘is’ the 
indistinctive and anonymous Others. 
At this point, I wish to argue that the solicitous call of care between Dasein and 
Others revoices Dasein’s echoing laughter, which is so excessively impotent and 
hypotonic that destroys the notion of presence in a duplicitous manner. As it is 
engaged in a caring dialogue with its ‘Doppelgänger,’ Dasein converses through and 
within its Selfhood and produces a duplicitous voice. In a way, Dasein becomes a 
figure of ridiculous proportions: one Self with two mouths and four ears. But again, 
Dasein’s solicitous call is described as a ‘backward [Rück]’ and ‘forward [Nach]’ 
movement. Heidegger writes: ‘Just as circumspection belongs to concern as a way of 
discovering what is ready-to-hand, solicitude [Fürsorge] is guided by re-spect 
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[Rücksicht] and for-bearance [Nachsicht]’ (SZ 123). This backward and forward 
movement is explicated in terms of a loss. Heidegger notes: 
The appeal calls back by calling forth [Der Anruf ist vorrufender Rückruf]: it 
calls Dasein forth [vor] to the possibility of taking over, in existing, even that 
thrown entity which it is; it calls Dasein back [zurück] to its thrownness 
[Geworfenheit] as the null ground [nichtiger Grund] which it has to take up 
existence. This calling back in which conscience calls forth gives Dasein to 
understand that Dasein itself—the null ground for its null projection, standing in 
the possibility of its Being—is to bring itself back to itself from its lostness in the 
they; and this means that it is loss [schuldig ist]. (SZ 287) 
Heidegger here plays with the multivocality of the noun ‘schuldig.’ In addition to 
‘guilty’ and ‘blameworthy,’ it also means ‘due’ in the sense of a ‘lack.’37 Heidegger 
insists that one understands the idea of ‘schuldig’ existentially, i.e., as ‘Being-the-
ground for a Being which has been defined by a “not”’ (SZ 283). Hence, by going 
back and forth, Dasein recalls itself as lack. 
By arguing that Dasein is a thrown entity, Heidegger insists that Dasein is 
dispensed necessarily within a movement that pendulates in a ‘null’ way. Dasein’s 
explicit thrownness suggests ‘the facticity of its being delivered over [Faktizität der 
Überantwortung andeuten]’ (SZ 135). The ‘matter of fact’ here is that Dasein is thrown 
in a null movement that ‘over-responses’; Dasein delivers a response [Antwort] in the 
manner of an excess, and it does so loudly that it deafens and disorients. Heidegger 
writes: 
Dasein’s facticity is such that as long as it is what it is, Dasein remains in the 
throw, and is sucked into the curl [Wirbel] of the they’s inauthenticity. 
Thrownness, in which facticity lets itself be seen phenomenally, belongs to 
Dasein, for which, in its Being, that very Being is an issue. Dasein exists 
factically [Dasein existiert faktisch]. (SZ 179) 
Dasein’s thrownness is described as a movement of ‘curl’ which, through and within 
the force of its own movement, Dasein loses itself. The statement ‘Dasein exists 
factically’ means that Dasein is lost in the movement of its own echoing. Dasein’s 
calling back and forth is a null projection that produces a null echo. This hypotonic 
tonality of the echo of the call of conscience attests Dasein’s self-projection, self-
throwness, or self-dispensation. 
Nonetheless, it is only within an interpretative and hermeneutic understanding 
that Dasein projects itself. This hermeneutic movement of understanding is again 
enabled by tonality. Heidegger writes: 
                                                     
37 Oxford-Duden German Dictionary, 3rd ed., Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005, p. 638. 
 COSMOS AND HISTORY 199 
Understanding is never free-floating but always attuned. The ‘Da’ gets 
equiprimordially disclosed by tune [Stimmung] or else closed off. Attunement 
[Befindlichkeit] brings Dasein face to face with its thrownness in such a way that 
the latter is not known as such, but is disclosed far more primordially in ‘how 
one is [wie einem ist].’ Existentially, Being-thrown [Geworfensein] means finding 
oneself either way [so oder so] in such attunement. (SZ 340-341) 
Dasein understands itself as its own possibility and as it really ‘is’ in the way the call of 
conscience is attuned. But as noted earlier, this attunement is ridiculous because it 
demands a single saying by two mouths and a unique hearing by four ears—the 
deceptive banter between Dasein and Others. Attunement, then, is the consonance of 
the uncanny call of conscience. Heidegger insists that ‘Dasein-with is already 
essentially manifest in a co-attunement and a co-understanding [Mitdasein ist 
wesenhaft schon offenbar in der Mitbefindlichkeit und im Mitverstehen]’ (SZ 162). 
Therefore, the tune of the call of conscience is the dispensed echo by which Dasein 
finds its unique Selfhood as Being-with. It is a concordant tune, a proper diapason, a 
symphonic echo that discovers itself exactly both ‘at’ and ‘through’ the interval of all 
chords.38 This symphony is duplicitous because it is characterized by a double accent 
and a double tempo. This puzzling character of the dual tonality of the call’s tune is 
exhibited by the phenomena of ‘apprehensibility [die Furcht]’ and ‘disquiet [die 
Angst].’39 
As Heidegger notes, apprehensibility is ‘an inauthentic attunement’ and ‘harmful 
[abträglich] to Dasein’s factical potentiality-for-Being’ (SZ 341). In apprehensibility, 
there is a diachronic consonance of the call. This means that, at any time, (a) Dasein 
laughs and Others listen or alternatively (b) Others laugh and Dasein listens. 
However, the exchange of laughter between Dasein and Others is just a sign of a 
distorting revelling. Heidegger notes that that in the face of this potential consonance, 
one backs way in ‘perplexity [Verwirrung]’ and ‘depression [Gedrücktheit].’ He also 
notes that this ‘perplexity is grounded upon a forgetting’ (SZ 342). Since the 
concordant tune is a sign of a distorted exchange, the apprehensibility of an 
oppositional laughing and hearing occurs elliptically and is itself a sign of a lack. 
Indeed, Heidegger states that speech is characterized by ‘idle talk [das Gerede]’ 
because ‘we have the same thing in view, because it is in the same averageness that we 
have a common understanding of what is said’ (SZ 168). Thus, the apprehensible 
                                                     
38 The Greek ‘διαπασ ν’ designates the concord of all the notes ranging from the first to the last. It is a 
symphony echoed ‘through’ and ‘at’ the interval of all the notes of the scale [  δι  πασ ν τ ν χορδ ν 
συμφωνία]. See Liddell and Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, p. 406. 
39 I purposely choose to translate ‘die Befindlichkeit,’ ‘die Stimmung,’ ‘die Furcht,’ and ‘die Angst’ 
respectively as ‘attunement,’ ‘tune,’ ‘apprehensibility,’ and ‘disquiet.’ 
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oppositional laughter between Dasein and Others articulates nothing in particular 
because it says the same over and over again. The same laughing echo is repeated in 
infinity without in fact communicating anything distinctively and apprehensibly. In 
other words, the laughing echo is distinctively delivered only insofar as it is delivered 
indistinctively as the same at all times. Heidegger states that apprehension forgets 
itself because ‘leaps from next to next’ (SZ 342). The repetition of the echo is so 
extremely repetitive that it is unrepeatable. It is similar to the effect of a riotous or a 
noisy mirth where the laughing sound is so rowdy and unruly that gives the 
impression that it carries equal intensities at all frequencies of its range. This 
boisterous laughter is nowhere and anywhere, never and all the time. Heidegger calls 
this ‘nowhere/anywhere’ and ‘never/all the time’ effect of speech as ‘curiosity 
[Neugier].’ He notes that curiosity ‘seeks disquiet [Unruhe] and the excitement of 
continual novelty and alternating encounters’ (SZ 172) and that it is characterized by a 
‘never dwelling anywhere [Aufenthaltslosigkeit]’ (SZ 173). Finally, because the laughter’s noise 
signal is so tranquilizing, mesmerizing, random, and heterogeneous, the echo’s ability 
to generate a moment of finite tone is impossible. In this way, as Heidegger notes, ‘it 
soon becomes impossible to decide what is disclosed in a genuine understanding and 
what is not.’ Heidegger calls this ambivalent understanding as ‘ambiguity [Die 
Zweideutigkeit]’ (SZ 173). In its ambiguous rattling, the laughing echo brings 
understanding to an excessive ruination that does not leave behind any signs of visible 
remains. 
It is this overly devastating ruination that the laughing echo of Dasein 
reverberates in its deafening revelry with Others. In this monotonous repetition of an 
average and everyday laughter, what is diachronically echoed is an indiscernible 
presence that cannot be taken for granted. The erratic spasm of Dasein’s laughter 
converges and converses a distorted presence that could never be possibly understood 
as something present. The ‘ha ha ha’ sound of Dasein ridicules and demeans the 
quest for Self-knowledge in the most excessive way, and it eventually laughs at 
nothing in particular. In this way, the question of the meaning of Being, which Dasein 
brings into a hermeneutic understanding through its clattering laughter, transmits and 
delivers a destructive laughter that undermines the notion of presence so ridiculously 
that it cancels it as an issue of proper inquiry. But again, it is done so in the most 
duplicitous manner. And here exactly lies the ironic joke: only as a non-issue the issue 
of presence could be inquired in a proper way. 
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CONCLUSION: LAUGHING AT HEIDEGGER’S LAUGHTER 
The task at hand resists a concluding note because it requires that we keep laughing. 
By doing so, we are forcibly engaged in a funny game by which we appreciate the full 
extent of Heidegger’s laughter by demeaning its boisterous magnitude. The laughter 
of Hermes entertains Heidegger as a thinker who bears no extraordinary status 
among other thinkers. Heidegger becomes a diachronic thinker if and only if he is 
thought from within a tradition of other thinkers and poets. Heidegger becomes 
presenting and presentable only from within a long discourse of thinking that 
presupposes the notion of presence as something objectively present. 
But the relegating laughter that delivers Heidegger to the philosophical heritage 
he essentially belongs resounds ambivalently. On the one hand, the possibility of 
presenting Heidegger as just another presentable philosopher retrieves the essential 
ground of presence as something excessively transcendental, impossible, and null. On 
the other hand, the ruinous dissimulation of the essence of Heidegger’s philosophical 
presentation delivers Heidegger not as an impossible thinker but rather as a truly 
possible one. In the trickiest fashion, the task of laughing at Heidegger levels 
Heidegger down to that which he truly ‘is.’ Laughing at Heidegger and other thinkers 
only shows a genuine concern for them because it leads to their positive confirmation 
as significant, albeit through the annihilation of the site of concern itself and its 
conversion into an Unthought and Unthinkable site that bears no positive 
significations and limitations. 
Therefore, by laughing at Heidegger and other philosophers, we only show our 
true concern for what they want to say. We pay heed to their speech and sound, but 
only through a discourse of understanding that exhibits a sense of laughter and 
jesting. Indeed, the comic echo of laughter becomes the subversive effect that orients 
understanding against objectification, formalization, and standardization. It defies the 
attempt to break tradition into fixed camps, dogmas, or orthodoxies. It defeats any 
expectations of shared presuppositions and predictable interpretations by producing 
an echo of unexpected inversions, contortions, and explosions, thus opening our ears 
to the incalculable transmutations of traditional thinking. The echo of laughter 
defamiliarizes us from tradition so that we, at every time, unlearn and overcome what 
we have been taught. It releases us from our previous assumptions and teaches us how 
to question the unquestioned and unquestionable. By laughing at Heidegger’s 
laughter, we remain careful to Heidegger’s task of thinking which forces to remain 
attuned to the overwhelming plethora of questions that stay obfuscated in 
philosophical thinking. But we do so ironically, since remaining attuned to the 
neglected questions of tradition requires that we remain attuned to the accent and 
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measurement of a possible hermeneutics of laughter, which Heidegger so carelessly 
disregarded. 
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